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 1 
Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change: lessons from Gaza 
 
 
 
Michael Mason, Mark Zeitoun, Rebhy El Sheikh 
 
1. Introduction 
What the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) labels “key” vulnerabilities to 
climate change – those meriting policy attention as symptomatic of “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference” with the climate system (UNFCCC Article 2) – are seen to depend on the 
magnitude, timing and distribution of climate impacts. Moreover, deliberations on climate 
impacts are inherently political: they feature value judgments about the acceptability of 
potential risks, and potential adaptation and mitigation measures, and oblige consideration of 
such wider themes as development, equity and sustainability (Schneider et al., 2007, p. 784). 
This paper reports on, and discusses, representations of climate vulnerability generated from 
stakeholder deliberations in the highly charged geopolitical context of a territory, the Gaza 
Strip, marred by routine violence and endemic human insecurity. In these extreme conditions, 
as argued below, non-climatic determinants of vulnerability set the main conditions of life by 
which susceptibility to climate harm is increased and response capabilities are impaired. 
 
At least in terms of exposure to climate change, Palestinians in Gaza face disruptive climate 
impacts on a par with the populations of other semi-arid territories in Western Asia. Climate 
predictions in the eastern Mediterranean are compromised by deficits in meteorological data 
and uncertainties regarding the incorporation in climate models of region-specific conditions 
and processes (Mellouki and Ravishankara, 2007). Nevertheless, climate simulations recently 
undertaken with regional models have delivered generally consistent results (Khatib, 2009; 
Kitoh et al., 2008; Somot et al., 2008). Over the course of this century, and depending on the 
global emissions scenario employed, there is predicted to be: (i) a decrease in precipitation of 
up to 35% (with significant seasonal variation), (ii) a significant warming of between 2.60C and 
4.80C, (iii) a tendency towards more extreme weather events, and (iv) a rise in sea-level. For 
the Gazan population of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)1, the biophysical impacts 
expected from these trends include an increased probability of flash floods, droughts, 
desertification and saline intrusion into groundwater (UNDP, 2010a, pp. 9-13). 
 
With reference to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) consultations on climate 
vulnerability undertaken with stakeholders in Gaza between December 2008 and August 
2009, this paper highlights key vulnerabilities to climate change there – specifically in terms of 
food security and water security. The context is that of a continuing belligerent occupation by 
Israel, including the imposition since January 2006 of an economic sanctions and closure 
regime, as well as the continuing effects of the Israeli military assault in December 2008-
January 2009.2 The general social resilience of the population in Gaza serves little to reduce 
its overall climate vulnerability. Exploration of the “climate vulnerability pathways” finds a 
conflict-structured component of vulnerability overwhelming projected climatic risks. The 
mechanisms of the occupation and siege of Gaza impose constraints on the capacity of 
residents to cope with, and adapt to, climate-related hazards.  
 
                                            
1
 Our use of the term ‘occupied Palestinian territory’ follows the accepted nomenclature employed by the United 
Nations in reference to a series of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beginning with 
Resolution 242 in November 1967. 
2
 While Israel has stated that, with its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, its status as an 
occupying Power there has finished, it still maintains effective control of the Strip and thus remains bound by 
international humanitarian obligations regarding belligerent occupation (Dinstein, 2009, pp. 276-280). 
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In this paper we first justify the definition of climate vulnerability employed (Section 2) and 
provide a brief geographical profile of the Gaza Strip (Section 3). We then discuss the key 
pathways of climate vulnerability identified by stakeholders in Gaza (Section 4), which 
conjoined with short-term and long-term response capabilities (Section 5), provide a collective 
representation of key climate vulnerabilities. We conclude that, under the current conditions of 
the Israeli blockade and associated security interventions, there is no scope for pro-active 
climate adaptation in the Gaza Strip. More generally, assessments of climate vulnerability 
within humanitarian spaces are scientifically incomplete inasmuch as they ignore chronic, non-
climatic determinants of human insecurity. 
 
 
2. Framing climate vulnerability 
According to the IPCC, vulnerability to climate change is “the propensity of human and 
ecological systems to suffer harm and their ability to respond to stresses imposed as a result 
of climate change effects” (Adger et al., 2007, p. 720). Behind this compact definition lies an 
attempt to integrate distinctive theoretical perspectives, which have tended to emphasise 
either biophysical or socio-political dimensions of climate vulnerability. The former is 
characterised by risk-hazard approaches which focus on exposure to climate perturbations or 
stresses in the context of biophysical system sensitivities (e.g. Alcamo et al., 2008; Kates et 
al., 1985; Downing and Patwardhan, 2003). Vulnerability in these terms combines with climate 
change events to generate potential threats to human and ecological systems. In contrast, 
“social vulnerability” approaches centre less on biophysical stresses than on the socio-
economic and political conditions that determine the capacity of people to respond to these 
climate events. This perspective derives mainly from research in environmental sciences and 
human geography, drawing on theories of entitlements and human well-being from 
development studies (e.g. Bohle and Watts, 1994; Brooks, 2003; Kelly and Adger, 2000). 
 
While early IPCC formulations of vulnerability highlighted biophysical impacts of climate 
change, it is now recognised that climate vulnerability includes both the “external” exposure of 
socio-ecological systems and their “internal” susceptibility and adaptive capacity (Adger, 2006; 
Füssel and Klein, 2006). This integrated understanding of vulnerability is evident in the Fourth 
Assessment Report and the IPCC-sponsored global research project, Assessment of Impacts 
and Adaptations to Climate Change (Leary et al., 2008). In principle, it opens up vulnerability 
assessments to consider the full range of non-climatic determinants, including socio-political 
and socio-economic evaluations of climate impacts, although the IPCC has still been charged 
with neglecting the root causes of vulnerability (Gaillard, 2010, p. 224). Such criticism is 
misplaced insofar it ignores the role of IPCC Working Group II in identifying the high climate 
vulnerability of poor and marginalised communities (especially in developing countries), as 
well as its explicit call for more research on the causal links between development paths and 
vulnerabilities to climate change (Schneider et al., 2007, p. 804). Nevertheless, the regional 
and sectoral scope of IPCC assessments can displace scientific and policy attention from, for 
example, key climate vulnerabilities facing poorer populations in sub-regions or territories 
exposed to the effects of conflict: the Gaza Strip is one such conflict zone where a more fine-
grained treatment is justified. 
 
In its contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC Working Group II acknowledges 
that fragile governance systems and conflicts, armed and otherwise, typically heighten the 
vulnerability of people to climate risks, though only recent conflicts in Africa - within the 
Greater Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region - are discussed (Boko et al., 2007, pp. 442-
443). More widely, Barnett (2006, pp. 117-125) identifies at least 37 countries facing or 
recovering from conflict since 1989, arguing that their affected populations are especially 
vulnerable to climate variability and extremes because of their low capacity to cope with, and 
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recover from, such stresses. Most of these countries, he notes, have faced significant food 
shortfalls as natural resource assets and livelihood opportunities have been severely eroded 
by the effects of conflict. In societies marred by protracted military occupation, as in East 
Timor (1975-1999) and the occupied Palestinian territory (1967-), the entrenched social 
vulnerability created by systemic human rights violations is likely to overwhelm the impacts of 
particular climate hazards (Barnett, 2010, pp. 260-262; Mason, 2011). For Gaza, as argued 
below in Section 4, the Israeli closure regime significantly weakens the capacity of 
Palestinians to cope with, and adapt to, key climate risks. We employ the term “enforced 
coping” to refer to the constrained (and possibly harmful) ways people seek to mitigate or 
avoid significant climate-related harm under conditions of exceptional vulnerability. The 
presence of enforced coping questions the view (e.g. Agrawal and Perrin, 2009, p. 354) that 
governments and other external actors necessarily increase the adaptive capacity of 
economically marginal communities by strengthening the existing coping strategies of 
households and other social groups (cf. Smit and Wandel, 2006, p. 289). 
 
We focus here on a UNDP-facilitated stakeholder assessment of climate vulnerability in Gaza, 
which took place in three phases between December 2008 and August 2009. This was part of 
a broader climate change adaptation initiative in support of the Palestinian Authority (UNDP, 
2010a), and reflects also a worldwide UNDP Climate Adaptation Programme assisting 75 
countries in their responses to climate change. Given pressing humanitarian and development 
needs in Gaza and the West Bank, the UNDP climate adaptation work for the Palestinians 
was framed explicitly by the agency’s perspective on “human security”, defined by its regional 
bureau as “the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and 
comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable” (UNDP, 2009, p. 2; 
see Dalby, 2009, pp. 41-43). UNDP-sponsored human security reports covering the Middle 
East have paid growing attention to major environmental threats, notably those impacting on 
water availability and food production; for example, a recent Arab Human Development 
Report highlights potential threats to regional water and agricultural systems from climate 
change (UNDP, 2009, pp. 47-50), while the latest Palestinian Human Development Report 
pinpoints declining water availability and inadequate wastewater facilities as chronic threats to 
human security in the oPt (UNDP, 2010b, pp. 89-93). Framing human security in a climate 
vulnerability context highlights human capacities and freedoms to pursue lives and livelihoods 
free from threats induced or compounded by climate hazards (Adger, 2010; O’Brien et al., 
2007; Pelling, 2010). As noted below (Section 4), initial stakeholder consultations in Gaza 
identified water insecurity and food insecurity as the key threats to human security in the 
context of forecasted climate risks. 
 
 
3. The geography of the Gaza Strip 
Gaza’s coastline is 41km long, comprising sandy beaches and dunes with occasional 
outcrops of calcareous sandstone. Its subsoil conditions (consolidated sedimentary rocks, 
sand and clays) resemble many non-deltaic coastal areas in the Mediterranean Basin and 
the Middle East. However, the coast is generally more open, without the barrier islands 
found off the coasts of north Africa or Saudi Arabia (Food and Agriculture Organization, 
1997, p. 49). Several jetties, sea walls and shipwrecks provide the only barrier influence 
on local tidal conditions. The northern coast adjacent to Gaza City is most built-up (see 
Figure 1), though erosion and ecological degradation is observable along the entire 
coastline, notably from extensive sand mining for use in construction – including 
substantial amounts of sand transported out of Gaza by Israel just before its withdrawal in 
2005. As noted in a recent UN environmental assessment, for many decades the coastal 
and marine environment of the Gaza Strip has been significantly impacted by sewage 
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pollution, waste dumping and over-fishing (UNEP, 2009, p. 63), with additional stresses 
from the collapse of sewage treatment systems during the 2008-9 Gaza war. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Built-up area in the Gaza Strip (UNEP, 2009: Map 2) 
 
Despite its small area (378km2) and flat terrain, there are significant variations in the Gaza 
Strip’s temperate climate: the average seasonal rainfall is 422mm in the northern 
governorate and 225mm in the southern Rafah governorate (Palestinian Water Authority, 
2007). The Gaza Strip experiences hot, dry summers and mild winters. There is already 
some evidence that global warming is affecting the Gaza Strip: an analysis of daily 
temperature data from 1976 to 1995 has shown an increase in mean temperature of 0.4C, 
which reflects above all an upward trend in mimimum temperature values (El-Kadi, 2005). 
 5 
This finding is corroborated by Israeli research demonstrating that average temperatures 
in the eastern Mediterranean have increased steadily over the last 100 years, with 
increased inland aridity (Krichak et. Al, 2007; Kafle and Bruins, 2009). 
 
With 1.5 million people (and a population growth rate of 3.4% per annum), it is not surprising 
that the coast has been comprehensively modified by human activity. Gaza is experiencing 
rapid urbanisation trends: in 2004 21% of the Strip was urbanised and, if the current 
population growth rate continues, it has been forecast that 48% of the Strip will be urbanised 
by 2025 (Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem 2006: 83). Current Israeli restrictions on 
labour, trade and financial/investment flows into Gaza prevent long-term infrastructure 
investment and urban planning (Chalmers, 2009, World Bank, 2009). 
 
The human development situation in the Gaza Strip is particularly serious. Even before Israel 
undertook Operation Cast Lead in winter 2008/9, Israeli economic sanctions and the external 
blockade3 had triggered a collapse in industrial activity. Aside from the high level of human 
casualties caused by Operation Cast Lead, post-conflict damage assessment indicated a 
serious threat to food security and water security, as discussed later. The most visible signs of 
this were the razing of up to 18% of cultivated lands (including the destruction of greenhouses, 
livestock and poultry farms), serious damage or destruction to 203 registered agricultural 
groundwater wells and four drinking water wells, as well as damage to over 19,000 metres of 
water pipes (Palestinian National Authority, 2009).4 Reconstruction efforts have been 
seriously hampered by the continuing blockade (UNDP, 2010c, p. 10). 
 
Higher numbers of the population in Gaza are dependent on social and humanitarian 
assistance: two-thirds are UNRWA-registered refugees. A survey of the latest available 
household and expenditure data for the Gaza Strip confirms a deepening of poverty, which 
relates to a deterioration of living conditions since the imposition of the Israeli blockade: in 
2007 68% of Palestinians in southern Gaza and 72% in northern Gaza lived below the poverty 
line (UNRWA, 2009). Between 1995 and 2009. total unemployment rose in Gaza from 29.4% 
to 39.3% (Palestinian National Authority, 2010, p. 13). The poor general situation of public 
health levels and services corresponds as would be expected with high levels of poverty and 
unemployment (Chalmers, 2009; Shomar, 2010).  
 
 
4. Mapping climate vulnerability pathways in the Gaza Strip  
While formally involving the Palestinian Quality Authority (EQA) as lead agency, the impetus 
for climate adaptation planning in the oPt was driven from external funders, reflecting a global 
UN agenda for mainstreaming climate adaptation in its human development studies. Informed 
by the UNDP Adaptation Policy Frameworks for Climate Change (Lim et al., 2005), the 
Palestinian initiative featured  stakeholder engagement in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
including interviews and discussions with key stakeholders, a questionnaire survey of relevant 
experts, scoping meetings, and feedback meetings on a draft Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategy. In Gaza, the relevant stakeholders included the EQA, Palestinian Water Authority 
(PWA) and Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) officials (attending as independent 
water experts), UNDP Gaza Strip staff, environmental scientists from universities and NGO 
representatives (see UNDP 2010a: 25-27, 30-32). UN-imposed restrictions prevented any 
meetings with Hamas officials. 
                                            
3
 Economic sanctions against Gaza started with the January 2006 victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative 
Elections: they were tightened even further in September 2007 following the declaration by Israel that the Gaza Strip 
was a “hostile entity”. 
4
 According to a survey conducted by the Palestinian Hydrology Group, in the worst affected areas of Al Attara and 
Ezbet Abed Rabbo half the water networks were damaged (Palestinian National Authority, 2009, p. 29). 
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Participatory vulnerability assessments are oriented to identifying risk conditions and 
anticipated community responses as experienced or judged by affected parties (Delica-
Willison, 2004; Smit and Wandel, 2006; Vogel et al., 2007). As noted above (Section 2), the 
climate vulnerability approach employed by the UNDP in Gaza was framed according to 
principles of human security, which throws light on those people most susceptible to life and 
livelihood threats induced or compounded by climate hazards. An initial review of the climate 
change scenarios for the eastern Mediterranean and stakeholder consultations concluded that 
vulnerability assessment in the Gaza Strip should focus on human insecurity as it relates to 
water resources insecurity – physically unsustainable withdrawal rates coupled with the lack of 
access of individuals to sufficient safe water for heath and well-being – and food insecurity – 
the lack of access of individuals to sufficient safe food for health and well-being (UNDP 2010a, 
p. 2). 
 
Figure 2 (below) summarises graphically those environmental risks relating to climate 
vulnerability identified by the Gazan stakeholders during the UNDP consultations in 2008-9. 
The emphasis here is on the multiple paths that lead to reduced water security (through 
degraded groundwater quality), and food security (through reduced food production, which is 
related to groundwater quality).5 The immediate (socio-economic and political) climate 
vulnerability of the residents of the Gaza Strip is compounded by the expected longer-term 
risks of climate change set out on the right-hand side of the figure. A higher variability in 
precipitation translates into reduced yields for rainfed agriculture, and could also mean a 
greater frequency of flash floods (e.g. the flooding in January 2010 that destroyed a road 
bridge in Al Zahra may be evidence of this). Reduced amounts of precipitation will mean 
greater strain on groundwater resources. Increased temperatures may also lead to greater 
groundwater pumping because of increased evapotranspiration and desertification 
(particularly in the south). Finally, any sea level rise will, as well as eroding the coastline, 
contaminate the coastal soil and increase the saline intrusion already experienced throughout 
Gaza.6 
 
However, the bulk of the vulnerability pathways arise from, or are compounded by, Israeli 
sanctions on, and blockade of, the Gaza Strip. The negative impacts on water security and 
food security resulting from current occupational practices can be seen on the left-hand side 
of the figure. The impact is ultimately felt in a reduction in the ability of individuals and groups 
to avoid, cope with or adapt to the consequences of climate variability and/or change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
5
 The approach is similar to the ‘chains of impacts’ analysis employed in Magnan et. al. (Magnan et al., 2009: Fig 7), 
and elsewhere.  
6
 There is much uncertainty over the magnitude of this rise for the eastern Mediterranean by 2100: Israeli scientists have 
forecast an increase of 0.1m every decade (Office of the Chief Scientist, 2008), which falls within recent global 
estimates of 0.6-1.6m (e.g. Jevrejeva et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2: Climate vulnerability pathways in the Gaza Strip (adapted from UNDP 2010a, p. 
36) 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Vulnerability pathways to water resources insecurity 
 
The broad notion of ‘water security’ encompasess the literature’s focus on water resources 
security,7 which considers primarily water quality and water quantity issues for the 
environment and for human use (Cook and Bakker, forthcoming). Palestinians living in the 
Gaza Strip suffer the effects of water insecurity through both water quantity and water quality 
issues (World Bank, 2009, pp. 27-32). The entire territory of Gaza lies above part of the 
Coastal Aquifer Basin, which runs from Haifa to northern Egypt through Gaza. Due primarily to 
its permeable sandy cover, the aquifer itself has “intrinsic vulnerability” to pollution (Almasri, 
                                            
7
 The broad understanding of water security also comprises related ‘security areas’ such as energy, food, human, and 
national security (Zeitoun forthcoming).  
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2008). Israeli over-pumping of the Israeli portion of the Coastal Aquifer in the 1960s and 
1970s led to high rapid salinisation through seawater intrusion. The risk of serious damage to 
the aquifer was countered by reducing abstractions, and the flows replaced through increased 
abstractions from other water sources (the Lake of Tiberias or the Western Aquifer Basin, 
whose recharge zones are transboundary with the West Bank) as well as from artificial 
recharge of the Israeli portion of the aquifer (Zeitoun, et al., 2009).  
 
Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip are prevented from accessing similar alternative water 
sources, such as bulk transfers of water from the West Bank. As a result, and in-line with 
population growth, the Gazan portion of the Coastal Aquifer Basin has been pumped beyond 
sustainable limits, for decades. The “sustainable limit”8 of the Coastal Aquifer has been 
estimated from 299 (HSI, 1999: IV) to 420 million cubic metres/year (MCM/y) (World Bank, 
2009, p. 27), of which the Gazan portion is roughly 55 MCM/y (Yacoubi, 2008). Total pumping 
within the Gaza Strip in 2008 was estimated at 170 MCM/y (UNICEF, 2010, p. 12). Return 
flows from system leaks, wastewater and irrigation amount to 31-51 MCM/y (Palestinian 
Water Authority, 2000). Not accounting for “return” flows,9 this means that the Gazan portion 
of the aquifer is being over-drawn at a rate up to three times its sustainable limit. 
 
The abstraction rate and lack of alternative water sources leads directly to deteriorating water 
quality. As has been the case in Israel, the over abstraction induces increased seawater 
intrusion and up-coning, leading to salinisation of the freshwater. Israeli restrictions on the 
import of construction materials have immobilised local and donor efforts to treat wastewater, 
furthermore (UNEP, 2009). Untreated or partially treated wastewater (including sewage 
infiltrating from the Northern Treatment Plant in Beit Lahiya, and the rapidly growing raw 
sewage outflows around Khan Younis, Rafah and Wadi Gaza) seeps into the groundwater, 
further increasing nitrate and chloride levels. An additional source of contamination occurs 
through natural processes – the Eocene salts migrating under the border from Israel 
(Vengosh, et al., 2005). Reduced recharge means less dilution of runoff laden with agricultural 
fertilisers and pesticides (although the potential for contamination can be partially offset by 
longer flow paths to the water table). It has been estimated that only 5-10% of the portion of 
the aquifer under Gaza provides acceptable drinking water (Palestinian Water Authority, 2010, 
p. 27; UNDP, 2010c, p. 40) – a severe case of chronic water resources insecurity. 
 
The biophysical and social causes of the water resources insecurity impact on human well-
being in a number of ways. In terms of public health, poor drinking water quality has led to 
gastro-intestinal diseases, methomoglobinemia, dental fluorsis and diarrhoea (Al-Farra, 2005; 
Shomar, 2010; World Bank, 2009, p.27). A greater percentage of household income is spent 
on associated medical bills, as well as for treated water. Roughly 80% of the Gaza population 
uses desalinated water from the private sector, which is below international drinking water 
standards and subject to microbiological contamination in transit or when stored at home 
(GVC/PHG, 2009; UNICEF, 2010, pp. 12-15). Palestinian farmers, whose livelihoods are 
linked with water resources, feel the impact in terms of reduced yields, as we will see.  
 
                                            
8
 The concept of safe yield and sustainable limits of aquifers is highly contested, with Bredehoeft (1997) asserting the 
irrelevancy of aquifer recharge rate to sustainable pumping rates, in what is known as the water budget myth. Here, 
“sustainable limit” refers to the rough mean recharge rate, i.e. the amount of rainwater flowing into the Gaza portion of 
the Coastal Aquifer.  
9
 “Return” flows refers to water that returns to the aquifer from where it was abstracted, i.e. household wastewater and 
surplus irrigation. A reliable figure of abstracted volumes is possible as these are mainly metred, but “return” flows are 
not. Return flows have been roughly estimated at 80 MCM/y. Quality issues must be taken into consideration when 
assessing the actual capacity of the aquifer, however, as the “return” flows are of very poor quality and serve to 
contaminate the aquifer further (Vengosh, et al., 2005).  
 9 
Water quality and sanitation problems accentuated by the Israeli blockade and economic 
sanctions were further stressed during Operation Cast Lead by Israeli military damage to 
water wells, as well as to the water distribution and sewage network. For example, a direct hit 
to the embankment wall of the Az Zaitoun wastewater treatment plant led to a wastewater and 
sludge spillage affecting 55,000 square metres of agricultural land (UNEP, 2009, pp. 33-36).  
 
4.2 Vulnerability pathways to food insecurity 
The UNDP assessment of the vulnerability of the Gazan population to climate-induced food 
insecurity corresponded to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) definition of food 
insecurity as the lack of adequate physical, social or economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009, p. 8). For households in Gaza, FAO 
defines food insecurity as households with income and consumption below $1.6 US per capita 
per day and households showing a decrease in total food and non-food expenditures (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 2007, p. 58). At this scale of household food security, according 
to a Joint Rapid Food Security Assessment conducted in 2008, some 56% of citizens of the 
Gaza Strip were ‘food insecure’ with 75% receiving food assistance (WFP/FAO/UNRWA, 
2008). A year later, with the onset of Operation Cast Lead, this had jumped to 61% (973,600 
persons) food insecure with a further 16% (218,950 persons) vulnerable to food insecurity 
(WFP/FAO, 2009). 
 
As shown on Figure 2, stakeholder perceptions of climate risks to food insecurity in the Gaza 
Strip highlighted food production threats, whereby various biophysical changes projected to 
negatively affect yields are compounded by the multiple effects of the Israeli blockade. Food 
production is understood in these vulnerability pathways as a combination of physical 
production factors (e.g. water quantity and quality, agricultural supplements), social conditions 
of production (e.g. access to agricultural land, demographic growth), and economic variables 
(e.g. markets for exports, prices and availability of imported food). In these terms, trade 
barriers and market restrictions are largely responsible for the overall level of food insecurity in 
the Gaza Strip. Reliant upon Israel (and to a lesser extent, Egypt) for all goods not produced 
within the confines of Gaza, the population as a whole is dependent on Israeli decisions about 
the amount of food allowed in. Israeli tightening of the siege has significantly reduced both 
imports and exports, particularly since September 2007. The Gaza Strip’s overall “carrying 
capacity” – already stretched from the influx of refugees from British Mandate Palestine in 
1948 and 1967 – thus cannot be supplemented. For example, food imports lower reliance on 
limited freshwater supply to produce food locally. When imports are cut, water abstractions for 
agriculture increase, which sets into motion the previously-described drivers of groundwater 
contamination and water resources insecurity. 
 
The closure regime also affects the Gaza Strip fishing zone, which has shrunk from 20 
nautical miles (negotiated with Israel under the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement) to more 
restricted limits unilaterally imposed by Israel – 6 nautical miles from October 2006 and 3 
nautical miles since December 2008. This has shrunk Palestinian access to maritime areas by 
85% (OCHA-WFP, 2010. pp. 10-11). There is continuing evidence of coercive actions by the 
Israeli Navy against Palestinian fishing vessels: since the end of Operation Cast Lead the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported on several instances in which 
Israeli Navy vessels have fired on and boarded Palestinian fishing boats. Israeli restrictions of 
the Gazan fishing zone have significantly reduced the local fish catch from 2845 metric tonnes 
in 2008 to 1525 tonnes in 2009 (OCHA-WFP, 2010, pp. 24-25; UNDP, 2010c, p. 69). 
 
There are indications that regional warming may stimulate growth of some fisheries of 
economic value to the Palestinians (e.g. sardines), while at the same time threatening local 
population extinctions and the proliferation of harmful species (UNEP-MAP-RAC/SPA, 2008, 
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pp. 38-40). The wider spread of warm-water species in the eastern Mediterranean is projected 
to have multiple direct and indirect effects, including the introduction of exotic species through 
the Suez Canal (Bianchi, 2007). 
 
Farming communities in the Gaza Strip are also socially and economically vulnerable to 
climate hazards. The closure of the Strip limits exports, thereby cutting off a source of income 
from produce (generally strawberries, oranges and cut flowers) sold in markets in Israel, Egypt 
or Europe. The closure furthermore reduces imports of regulated fertilisers, which increase 
yields more efficiently (and safely) than unregulated fertilisers. Yields are also significantly 
reduced, furthermore, by the previously-discussed groundwater contamination. There are 
likely to be compounded by climate change-induced causes of higher salinity – reductions in 
precipitation (which can exacerbate groundwater salinity levels through reduced soil flushing 
and groundwater recharge), reductions in air moisture (which increase the soil water 
requirement of crops,10 or reduce fruit production), and the previously-discussed saline 
intrusion into the aquifer. Increased salinity levels in the groundwater directly reduce the yields 
of crops which can sustain them at all – e.g. onions and pulses. Other crops – such as 
oranges, strawberries, cherry tomatoes, and cut flowers – have little tolerance to high salinity 
levels. The 2009 International Food Policy Research Institute study Climate Change- Impact 
on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation projects reductions in each of the basic food staples 
throughout MENA, with a drop of production of about 33% in rice, 7% in wheat, 8% in Maize 
and 4% in millet (Nelson et al., 2009: Table 3). The drop in production in wheat in MENA is 
considerably below the projected global drop (of about 25%), due in part to the predicted 
regional aridity trend. The previously-mentioned climate change-induced altered growing 
seasons will also affect production, as farmers adapt through trial-and-error (but such 
reductions are particularly hard to estimate).  
 
Projections of food insecurity suggest it will continue to rise. Since September 2000 Israel has 
imposed movement restrictions inside the Green Line security barrier marking its border with 
Gaza, comprising a “no-go zone” of up to 500 metres from the barrier and a “high-risk zone” 
between 500 to 1000-1500 metres: this restricted area has reduced Gaza’s cultivable land by 
35%. In the past five years, Israeli access restrictions and the associated destruction of 
agricultural assets in this zone have resulted in the loss of 735 hectares of olive trees, almost 
1200 hectares of other fruit-bearing trees and 588 hectares of greenhouses: it has been 
estimated that the total economic value of all agricultural losses (including livestock farms) is 
US $267 million (OCHA-WFP, 2010, pp. 19-22.). 
 
 
5. Response capabilities: enforced coping mechanisms and adaptation planning 
The vulnerability of individuals and groups to climate-related hazards can be reduced by 
enhancing both short-term (coping) and long-term (adaptation) response capabilities. In the 
Gaza Strip the current means of avoiding or moderating such hazards are above all short-term 
and reactive, with little if any opportunity at present to develop longer-term resilience.  
 
5.1 Household and community coping mechanisms 
The high level of climate vulnerability reported by stakeholders in Gaza is perpetuated by 
insufficient resources and livelihood opportunities, as well as weak institutional capacities 
(UNDP, 2010a, pp. 30-32). Coping strategies in the face of water and food insecurity reveal a 
level of resilience; for example, individual well-digging, rainwater harvesting, purchasing food 
on credit and decreasing the amount of food consumed. In the midst of a hostile political and 
                                            
10 For example, according to CROPWAT simulations conducted by the PWA, an annual average increase in temperature of 
1
o
C will increase crop water requirements in the Gaza Strip by 6-11% (UNDP, 2010a, p. 36). 
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economic context, where conventional low-cost coping strategies (e.g. use of life savings) 
have generally been exhausted (WFP/FAO, 2009), enforced coping mechanisms are 
prevalent, with often harmful long-term effects. In the UNDP stakeholder consultations, for 
example, negative public health impacts were reported as a result of farmers using raw 
sewage for irrigation (due to reduced wastewater treatment) (UNDP, 2010a, p. 31). 
 
It is not surprising to find that community coping mechanisms responding to water security 
and food insecurity are related with ways to bypass the Israeli siege. For example, the 
increased ‘smuggling’ through the tunnels dug under the border with Egypt, or occasionally 
(as in February 2008) breaking down the wall separating the people from the markets in 
Egypt. Coping under such circumstances is an existential affair, and the capacity of 
Palestinians in Gaza to survive under the Israeli blockade is almost entirely defined by such 
’enforced’ coping mechanisms. Once ad-hoc, the hundreds of smuggling tunnels under the 
border with Egypt are now regulated and taxed by the Hamas-administered government. At 
least some of these face the threat of closure following Egyptian construction of an 
underground barrier to impede access (Levinson, 2010). 
 
Coping mechanisms developed to deal with the very poor water quality are diverse. The PWA 
and the CMWU face a dilemma about how to confront the untreated wastewater – let it 
continue to seep into the freshwater aquifer and pose a grave public health risk, or pump it 
several kilometres into the sea during an interim period in which a treatment plant would be 
built. The latter alternative is not an option due to Israeli prohibitions, and the contamination of 
the freshwater aquifer continues. 
 
The increasingly poor quality of drinking water also necessitates increased purchase of 
desalinated water from private-sector neighbourhood-level reverse osmosis units, or the 
purchase of under-the-sink water filtration units, both of which contribute to the ever-greater 
share of household income spent on basic services (Palestinian Water Authority, 2008a; 
2008b). However, much of the water stored in household water tanks remains biologically 
contaminated for lack of proper maintenance (GVC/PHG, 2009, p. 15). Neighbourhood water 
vendors have developed to sell treated water (again, through small scale reverse osmosis 
plants) to people at a more affordable cost. The quality of this water is not regulated, and has 
not been tested. Contamination is very likely either at the source (because of poor 
maintenance) or during transportation (contaminants entering the jerry-cans and buckets used 
to transport the water). The PWA, CMWU and municipalities have adapted their water-supply 
systems to the situation. In Khan Younis, for example, the CMWU notifies the residents about 
occasional contamination from wastewater intrusion and when less polluted water may still 
safely be used for washing. The water authorities have also developed the habit of mixing 
sources of safe and unsafe water – to increase the amount of water available for drinking, at a 
marginally safer quality level. 
 
Adaptation to the combined water and food insecurity is becoming evident through selection of 
less water-intensive and more salt-resistant crops, such as dates. Such agricultural practice is 
in fact a return to the traditional crops of the Gaza Strip, whereas cultivation of water-intensive 
citrus production originated as a policy of the Israeli occupation. The non-availability of 
fertilizers is encouraging farmers to rediscover organic methods, while they have also piloted 
the use of solar food-drying techniques as a result of the limited availability of cooking gas. 
Yet if, in a worst-case climate change scenario, an increase in crop water requirements 
combines with a further decrease in water quality, such coping mechanisms may prove 
insufficient to sustain farming livelihoods. With that threshold breached, a new set of 
vulnerabilities may have to be faced, such as prospects for alternative livelihoods in an 
economy prevented from trading with the world. 
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5.2 Climate change adaptation planning for Gaza 
Adaptation to climate change in the oPt encompasses a range of responses to the impacts of 
this change, focusing on climate events that pose a significant risk. In the case of Gaza, over 
the next 40-50 years, there is forecast to be a fall in annual average precipitation, an 
increased incidence of drought, an increase in the frequency of extreme events, and a 
significant rise in sea-level. The assessment of future climate events is of course limited by 
various uncertainties regarding the nature and scope of local impacts, but adaptation is 
justified because the costs of inaction may well be substantial. Climate change impacts are 
likely to negatively affect human and economic development in Gaza in a number of key areas 
– agriculture and food security, water resources, coastal zones, and public health. Above all, 
these impacts will fall on a population already with high social vulnerability and dependent to a 
large degree on external humanitarian and development assistance. As the vulnerability 
pathways and discussion of enforced coping mechanisms has shown, the ability to develop 
longer-term adaptive mechanisms to reduce climate vulnerability is severely degraded by the 
Israeli closure regime. Without the capacity to move beyond ‘enforced coping’ noted above, 
which is often destructive of social capital (e.g. local disputes over water), communities in 
Gaza face present and future climate hazards with little or no institutional protection. 
 
Adaptation to climate change can involve governmental, civil society and private sector actors. 
The initial focus of any such adaptation in Gaza should be on state institutions, as they are 
responsible for setting the general plans and policies by which significant climate change 
impacts can be addressed by all societal actors. Of course, due to Israeli occupational 
practices and the current political split between the Hamas-led government in Gaza and the 
Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, there is currently little political capacity for managing 
climate risk in the Gaza Strip. According to harm prevention principles under international 
humanitarian and environmental law, this situation nevertheless obliges Israel and other 
external actors to assist the Palestinians in Gaza to reducing their climate vulnerability. This 
should be done in a way that delivers ‘no regrets’ and ‘low regrets’ benefits (i.e. ‘do no harm’) 
in terms of disaster risk reduction and human development even if long-term climate trends 
are less harmful than predicted. The lifting of the Israeli blockade on Gaza which, as a 
collective punishment of a civilian population, breaches international law (e.g. Article 33 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention) is necessary for the implementation of effective climate risk 
reduction activities in Gaza. 
 
In the UNDP/PAPP climate adaptation consultations, it was noted by stakeholders in Gaza 
that an existing Environmental Preparedness Plan for the Gaza Strip could serve as a vehicle 
for adaptation planning. It was claimed that this plan could be developed (and integrate water 
resources management, coastal management, agricultural planning, land-use, etc) to take into 
account real and potential climate change impacts (Palestinian Water Authority, 2009, p. 14; 
UNDP/PAPP, 2010a, pp. 30-31). Similarly, there is a Coastal Area Protection and 
Management Plan, which has been awaiting implementation since 2000. This plan addresses 
observed and expected damages to seawater quality (e.g. from solid waste dumping and 
wastewater runoff) and the coast (e.g. dune erosion from sand mining) as a result of human 
activities. It also considers the impacts of sea level rise attributed to climate change and 
makes specific recommendations to help conserve coastal areas – such as ‘set back lines’ 
(beyond which no construction is allowed), improvements in fisheries legislation and habitat 
conservation efforts. However, the weak regulatory and legal context in the Gaza Strip, 
accentuated by the consequences of the Israeli blockade, means that that even the most 
basic of such recommendations are not being implemented. Building accountable and reliable 
response capacities to climate change in Gaza is also hampered by the substantial drop in 
international donor support following the election of the Hamas government in January 2006. 
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In response to the severe water insecurity in Gaza, new bulk-water solutions need to be 
considered, whether from transportation, importation or desalination. Large-scale (but step-by-
step) desalination is a possible long-term solution to the freshwater crisis in the Strip. 
Increased purchase of water from Israel is currently seen as problematic by Palestinian 
authorities for reasons of cost, quality, and national security. Imported water from Egypt is 
another option for mitigating increasing water scarcity in the context of climate change, 
although this is problematic as well due to Egypt’s strained relations with other riparian states 
sharing the Nile Basin. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Climate scientists forecast disruptive biophysical impacts for the eastern Mediterranean 
region, by the end of this century, as a consequence of climate change. Climate-induced risks 
to food and water security in the Gaza Strip are expected to include increased droughts and 
general water scarcity, decreased agricultural productivity, and reduced drinking water quality 
from greater salinisation of freshwater resources. These impacts will affect neighbouring 
countries in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. There are additional environmental 
stresses shared by the Palestinians in Gaza with other territories in the region, caused by 
rising human population density, urbanisation, and invasive species (Underwood et al. 2009). 
These processes will compound the predicted effects of climate change and highlight the 
need for regional cooperation on climate change adaptation. 
 
Forecasts of regional sea-level rises caused by climate change have high uncertainties 
attached, yet this is a serious issue for low-lying coastal areas in the Mediterranean Basin, 
most obviously the Nile Delta. According to the greenhouse gas emissions scenario, sea 
levels are forecast by the IPCC to rise at least 18 to 38cm (emissions scenario B1) and as 
much as 26 to 59cm (emissions scenario A1F1) by 2100. Recent research on polar ice flow 
processes has indicated that these estimates in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) 
may be too conservative (Jevrejeva et al., 2010). More accurate predictions for the 
Mediterranean Sea are possible only through longer time-series data from satellite altimetry 
and a more comprehensive in-situ tide-gauge network. Improved data collection and analysis 
would improve scientific understanding on why, since 1993, the sea levels in the eastern 
Mediterranean have risen more than in the west of the basin. In any case, the forecast sea- 
level rises of existing climate models pose a serious threat to the Gaza Strip through coastal 
erosion and saline intrusion into the Coastal Aquifer. There is the need in the Mediterranean 
Basin for a systematic inventory of the vulnerability of coastal aquifers to sea-level rise (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 1997). 
 
Climate change adaptation options have been proposed for Gaza by UNDP. Those ‘no-
regrets’ and ‘low-regrets measures’ which are judged to have the highest levels of adaptive 
capacity and technical feasibility include: the development of flood contingency plans, 
increased rainfall harvesting, more efficient water distribution (including for irrigation), 
wastewater treatment, the selection of crops and ruminants for tolerance to heat and drought, 
and the protection of coastal sand dunes (UNDP 2010a, pp. 41-47). Such proposals, which 
are designed to be integrated with human development initiatives, are of course relevant to 
the situation of poor urban and rural populations living in coastal environments in other parts 
of the Middle East and North Africa.  
 
However, pro-active climate change adaptation in the Gaza Strip is inconceivable in the 
current context of Israeli occupational practices, notably the protracted economic sanctions 
and blockade, which have triggered the breakdown of institutions for Palestinian governance. 
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In June 2010, under international pressure, the Israeli Security Council announced an easing 
the closure regime, though major restrictions have continued on imports of humanitarian 
materials, while all exports from Gaza remain banned (International Federation for Human 
Rights, 2010). The physical and psychological harm the blockade has inflicted on the civilian 
population has rendered them highly vulnerable to other stresses, including those arising from 
climate variability and change. The enforced coping mechanisms discussed above indicate 
that the adaptive capacity of individuals is weak and reactive, lacking wider infrastructural 
support (e.g. as might be provided by large-scale water desalination). They also demonstrate 
conditions where biophysical climate impacts significantly under-determine human 
vulnerability to climate change. While Gaza is often identified as an exceptional case, these 
findings are relevant to other regions where chronic non-climatic threats to human well-being 
overwhelm climatic stresses. 
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